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A NEW MODE OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION FOR HONG KONG
U
Michael Wilkinson* and Desmond Keane**
A novel form of dispute resolution, an alternative to litigation and arbitration, is
about to be introduced in Hong Kong. The authors explain the characteristics of the
new dispute resolution system, and identify a number of legal questions to which the
new system gives rise. On balance, the authors conclude that the new dispute
resolution system will not constitute an unacceptable ouster of the court's jurisdiction,
and will provide an expeditious and useful alternative to existing mechanisms.
Introduction
A new speedy,' private, non-statutory and potentially cost-saving mode of
dispute resolution is about to be introduced into Hong Kong. The new sys-
tem is intended as a useful alternative to litigation and arbitration. It provides
for both binding and non-binding documentary adjudication by a panel of
experts. A body, to be known as the "Adjudication Panel" (the Panel), is to
be established with the role of determining documentary disputes relating
to (a) commercial agreements; (b) transactions relating to land, intellec-
tual property, media, publishing, sport and entertainment, universities and
tertiary education, and corporate and partnership interests and valuations;
and (c) disputes involving professional negligence arising out of any of the
above matters.
The service will be available for the determination of disputes arising not
only in the private sector, but also for those involving Government. The new
body will determine disputes both in Hong Kong and England and Wales and
the parties can agree that the determination be made in accordance either
with the laws of Hong Kong or of England and Wales or of any other common
law jurisdiction.
The new dispute resolution process is groundbreaking and gives rise to a
number of legal questions that will be considered in this article. First, the
mechanics of the new process will be explained.
- Reader in Law, University of Hong Kong.
* Senior Counsel, Hong Kong Bar.
It is expected that determinations can be made within two months of the agreement of terms of
reference to a Panel. In matters of particular urgency, expedited determinations can be made within
seven days or less.
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Determination of Disputes by Experts and Differences Between Expert
Determination and Arbitration
The mode of resolution of disputes provided for is by way of expert determi-
nation. Expert determination is a procedure by which the parties to an
agreement contract jointly to instruct a third party to decide the issue.2 This
mode of dispute resolution has been available in England from as early as
1754' and has the advantages of being quick, private, and relatively cheap,
when compared with litigation or arbitration.
It is important to distinguish expert determination from arbitration.4 Whilst
the procedures bear many similarities, there are several significant differences:'
(a) disputes for resolution by way of arbitration are usually presented to
the arbitrator in a more formal manner (ie by pleadings) than is the
case in expert determinations;
(b) whereas an arbitrator exercises a judicial function very similar, but
not identical, to that of a judge, an expert manifests far fewer judicial
attributes in the exercise of his functions;
(c) whereas arbitrators in their decision-making are subject to a certain
degree of court supervision by way of appeal,6 experts are subjected
to a much smaller degree of court supervision;7
2 Expert Determination, John Kendall, (London: FT Law and Tax, 2nd edn) p 1.
The earliest reported example is Belchier v Reynolds (1754) 3 Keny 87; 96 ER 1318.
4 In Arenson v Casson Beckman Rutley & Co [1977] AC 405, 428 Lord Wheatley identified the follow-
ing attributes of arbitration: (i) there must be a dispute between the parties which has been formulated
in some way or another; (ii) the parties must have submitted the dispute to a third party to resolve in
such a manner that he is called upon to exercise a judicial function; (iii) in appropriate cases the
parties must have been given an opportunity to present submissions and evidence in support of their
claims; and (iv) the parties must have agreed to accept the third party's decision.
5 Some of the differences between arbitration and expert determination were identified by Kaplan J in
Mayers v Dlugash [1994] 1 HKC 755, where one of the parties had applied to have the "arbitrator"
removed under the Arbitration Ordinance (cap 341) for misconduct. Kaplan J held that the person
appointed to resolve the dispute had, in fact, been appointed in the capacity of an expert rather than
as an arbitrator and removal on grounds of misconduct was not, therefore, available. It must be bome
in mind that some of the differences between arbitration and expert determination may be removed
by agreement of the parties.
6 Appeal lies, with the consent of the parties or with the leave of the court, on any question of law
arising out of an arbitration award to the court under section 23(2) of the Arbitration Ordinance
(cap 341). The court must not grant leave, however, unless it considers that, having regard to all the
circumstances, the determination of the question of law concerned could substantially affect the
rights of one or more of the parties to the arbitration agreement: ibid s 23(4). According to the
"Nema Guidelines" (see Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd, the Nema [1982] AC 724, HL) the
courts are more likely to grant leave to appeal against a domestic award on a point of law where the
subject matter of the arbitration is a standard form of contract rather than a "one-off' contract which
is of importance to the parties alone.
7 See discussion in "Issues Arising from the Expert Determination Procedures", section (b), below.
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(d) whereas an arbitrator can be removed and an arbitration award can
be set aside on the grounds of failure to comply with the rules of
natural justice,' experts' determinations are not generally amenable
to judicial review;'
(e) whereas arbitration awards can be enforced directly by the courts,"
experts' determinations can only be enforced by way of a suit upon
the contract;"
(f) whereas oral evidence is commonly received in arbitrations, expert
determinations are often made upon documentary evidence alone;
(g) whereas arbitrators enjoy statutory immunity from suit in negligence,
experts do not" and any immunity they may enjoy must depend upon
the agreement of the parties.
The New Provisions
(a) Reference of disputes to the Panel
Any dispute within the relevant categories may be referred to the Panel ei-
ther by way of a pre-dispute agreement or after the dispute has arisen.
Where the parties agree to submit a relevant dispute to expert determination
by a Panel, they should agree in advance to abide by the Adjudication Panel
Rules (the Rules). The effect of the Rules is summarised below.
(b) Adjudication panels
Unless the parties agree to determination by a sole adjudicator, each refer-
ence to the Panel will be determined by a panel of three adjudicators nominated
by the Committee and each Panel will include one member who holds, or
who has held, appellate judicial office and / or who holds the title of Queen's
Counsel or Senior Counsel in a common law jurisdiction.
Under s 25(1), (2) of the Arbitration Ordinance, the court may remove an arbitrator where he has
misconducted himself or the proceedings and any award made may be set aside. Misconduct would
include breach of the "audi alteram partem" rule or lack of impartiality.
9 R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 2 All ER 853, CA; Dlugash v
Mayers [1997] 2 HKC 814. In the latter case, Le Pichon J held that, although a term would be implied
into a contract that an expert should conduct his determinations fairly, nonetheless, the duty to act
fairly did not necessarily bring into play the rules of natural justice in their full rigour. The learned
judge concluded by saying that nothing short of conduct that could not, on any reasonable view, be
said to be broadly fair would suffice to impugn an expert's determination. Some degree of egregious-
ness had to be established.
1o See s 2GG of the Arbitration Ordinance, which provides that an award on an arbitration is, with the
leave of the court, enforceable in the same way as a judgment of the court.
11 See discussion in "Issues Arising from the Expert Determination Procedures", section (c) below.
12 See discussion in "Issues Arising from the Expert Determination Procedures", section (d) below.
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(c) The Committee
The Committee has many functions, but the main ones are to decide whether
an issue is appropriate for determination by a Panel, to fix the reference fee to
be paid for each determination, to nominate the adjudicators on each Panel,
to give directions to the parties as to the lodgement of documents and to
make arrangements for the Panel hearings.
(d) The conduct of the determination
The Panel will make its determination upon the documents submitted to it
and will not generally hear oral evidence. In conducting the hearing the Panel
members act as experts rather than arbitrators. If the Panel is not unanimous
in its determination, the majority decision will prevail.
The determination may include terms as to the payment of interest, all or
part of the reference fee and costs.
(e) Appeals to the courts
Unless the parties agree otherwise, the validity of a determination may not be
challenged by way of appeal to the courts on the grounds of any absence of
reasons or alleged deficiency or error of fact or law. The effect of this provi-
sion is discussed in more detail below." In any case, however, where the court
does have jurisdiction," the parties have agreed that the Court of First In-
stance will have exclusive and final jurisdiction and, unless otherwise agreed,
no party will seek to exercise any right of appeal or application for leave to
appeal from the Court of First Instance to any other court.
(f) Enforceability of the Panel's determinations
The parties agree, by accepting the Rules, that they will comply with the
terms of any determination and, subject to what is said below," Panel
determinations will be enforced in the usual manner through the courts.
Issues Arising from the Expert Determination Procedures
Several interesting issues arising out of this new procedure merit considera-
tion and comment.
13 See discussion in "Issues Arising from the Expert Determination Procedures", sections (a) and (b)
below.
14 See "Issues Arising from the Expert Determination Procedures", section (b) below.
15 See discussion in "Issues Arising from the Expert Determination Procedures", section (c) below.
14 Michael Wilkinson and Desmond Keane (2001) HKLJ
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(a) Is it proper to oust the court's jurisdiction?
The Rules provide that the experts shall enjoy exclusive and binding jurisdic-
tion to determine all matters referred to them. Does this constitute an
unacceptable ouster of the court's jurisdiction? The answer would appear to
be that it does not. As a general principle, any provision purporting to oust a
person's right to sue in court will not be recognised on grounds of public
policy"6 . It should be noted that, in respect of arbitration agreements, the
legislature has specifically recognised the rights of the parties, subject to cer-
tain exceptions, to exclude any right of appeal (referred to as an "exclusion
agreement")." This provision does not, of course, extend to expert
determinations. It is suggested that a reference to an expert on the terms that
he will enjoy exclusive jurisdiction does not improperly oust the jurisdiction
of the court, since the court retains jurisdiction over certain aspects of the
determination procedure (see 4(b) below). Further, the court retains jurisdic-
tion to enforce the determination. Although the transfer of jurisdiction to
the expert is substantial, it is far from complete and not sufficient to offend
public policy."
(b) To what extent is an expert's determination reviewabe by the courts?
Although determinations of experts have been said to be "judge proof', 19 this
is not quite correct. The basic principle seems to be clear: the courts will
strive to uphold the terms of the agreement of the parties. As we have seen
above, where the parties accept the Adjudication Panel Rules, by so doing,
they agree that the validity of any determination will not be challenged on
the grounds of any deficiency or error of fact or law and no appeal will lie
from the determination. Since the parties have thereby clearly agreed to ex-
clude the jurisdiction of the court, the court will abide by that agreement and
will not interfere - even if the court would conclude that the expert's deter-
mination involves an error of fact or law.
This does not have the effect, however, of totally excluding the court's
jurisdiction. Case authority has established that, notwithstanding an exclu-
sion provision of the nature stated above, the courts will intervene if (a) the
expert has decided the wrong issue; (b) the expert has asked himself the wrong
questions; (c) the expert has departed substantially from his brief in some
other way; or (d) there has been fraud or collusion on the part of the expert in
reaching his determination.
16 See Dolenan and Sons v Osset Corporation [1912] 3 KB 257.
17 S 23B of the Arbitration Ordinance.
18 See further John Kendall "Ousting the Jurisdiction" (1993) 109 LQR 385.
19 See Jonathan Gaunt QC "What makes an award judge-proof?" [19911 29 Estates Gazette 70.
Vol 31 Part 1
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The case law merits brief attention. In Jones v Sherwood Computer Services
plc20 Dillon LJ held that, where the parties had agreed to be bound by the
report of an expert, that report, whether or not it contained reasons for the
conclusion in it, could not as a general rule be challenged in the courts on the
ground that mistakes had been made in its preparation. It could only be chal-
lenged if it could be shown that the expert had departed from the instructions
given to him in a material respect. The basis for this conclusion is purely that
"pacta sunt servanda": contracts must be obeyed."
The degree of court supervision over the expert is perhaps most succinctly
summarised by Lightman J in British Shipbuilders v VSEL Consortium Plc:22
(i) Questions as to the role of the expert, the ambit of his remit (or
jurisdiction) and the character of his remit (whether exclusive or
concurrent with a like jurisdiction vested in the court) are to be de-
termined as a matter of construction of the agreement.
(ii) If the agreement confers on the expert the exclusive remit to deter-
mine a question, then, subject to (iii) and (iv) below, the jurisdiction
of the court to determine the question is excluded because, as a mat-
ter of substantive law, for the purposes of ascertaining the rights and
duties of the parties under the agreement, the determination of the
expert alone is relevant and any determination by the court is irrel-
evant. It is irrelevant whether the court would have reached a different
conclusion or whether the court considers that the expert's decision
is wrong, for the parties have in either event agreed to abide by the
decision of the expert.
(iii) If the expert in making his determination goes outside his remit, eg
by determining a different question from that remitted to him or if
his determination fails to comply with any conditions which the agree-
ment requires him to comply with in making his determination, the
court may intervene and set his decision aside. Such a determination
by the expert as a matter of construction of the agreement is not a
20 [1992] 1 WLR 277.
21 Thus in Campbell v Edwards [1976] 1 WLR 403 Lord Denning MR said at 407: "It is simply the law of
contract. If two persons agree that the price of property should be fixed by a valuer on whom they
agree, and he gives that valuation honestly and in good faith, they are bound by it. Even if he has
made a mistake, they are still bound by it. The reason is because they have agreed to be bound by it.
If there were fraud or collusion, of course, it would be very different. Fraud or collusion unravels
everything". This conclusion, that the court's jurisdiction depends upon the extent to which it has
not been excluded by the agreement of the parties, is supported by the decision of the House of Lords
in Mercury Ltd v Director General of Telecommunications [1996] 1 WLR 48, HL.22 [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 106, 109.
(2001) HKLJ
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determination which the parties agreed should affect their rights and
duties and the court will say so."
(iv) Likewise, the court may set aside the decision of an expert, where the
agreement so provides, if his determination discloses manifest error."
(v) The court has jurisdiction ahead of a determination by the expert to
determine a question as to the limits of his remit or the conditions which
an expert must comply with in making his determination, but, as a rule
of procedural convenience, will, save in exceptional circumstances, de-
cline to do so. This is because the question is ordinarily merely
hypothetical, only proving live if, after seeing the decision of the expert,
one party considers that the expert got it wrong. To apply to the court in
anticipation of the decision and before it is clear that he has got it wrong,
is likely to prove wasteful of time and costs, the saving of which may be
presumed to have been the, or at least one of the, objectives of the par-
ties in agreeing to the determination of the expert.25
This approach was adopted by Le Pichon J in Diugash v Mayers,26 where
the learned judge concluded that it would render wholly nugatory the per-
ceived advantages of expert determination, if the court could second-guess
expert determinations by holding that they were flawed simply because the
court would have come to a different conclusion.
(c) How are experts' determinations enforced?
Unlike the award of an arbitrator, which legislation provides can be enforced
with the leave of the court in the same manner as a judgment of the court,27
23 See, for example, Sonnix Ltd v Kaifull Investments Ltd [2000] 3 HKC 102, where Yuen J said at 116
"Where an expert has been instructed to "verify" or ascertain the truth of a matter in a process which
raises a question of interpretation, and he misinterprets the legislation and makes a determination on
the basis of an incorrect interpretation, he is not dealing with the question as intended by the parties
and his decision is open to review by the courts".
24 See, for example, Mercury Communications Ltd v Director General of Telecommunications [1996] 1 WLR
48, HL, where there was no provision in the agreement giving exclusive jurisdiction to the expert
and excluding the court's jurisdiction.
25 These principles were approved in National Grid Co plc v M25 Group Ltd [1998] 2 EGLR 32. See also
Nikko Hotels (UK) Ltd v MEPC Plc [1991] 2 EGLR 103, where Knox J said at 108, "The result, in my
judgment, is that if the parties agree to refer to the final and conclusive judgment of an expert an
issue which either consists of a question of construction or necessarily involves the solution of a
question of construction, the expert's decision will be final and conclusive and, therefore, not open
to review or treatment by the courts as a nullity on the ground that the expert's decision on construc-
tion was erroneous in law, unless it can be shown that the expert has not performed the task assigned
to him. If he answered the right question in the wrong way, the decision will be binding. If he has
answered the wrong question, his decision will be a nullity". The same conclusion was reached in
Norwich Union Life Insurance Society v P & 0 Property Holdings Ltd [1993] 1 EGLR 164.
26 [1997] 2 HKC 814, 822.
27 S 2GG, Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 341).
Vol 31 Part 1I
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no statute provides for the enforcement of the determinations of experts. It
follows, therefore, that a decision of an expert cannot be directly enforced by
the courts. Can it be argued that the determination of an expert is, in reality,
the same as a decision of an arbitrator and can, therefore, be enforced under
the provisions of the Arbitration Ordinance? In view of the many distinc-
tions between arbitration awards and determinations of experts, we would
confidently suggest that an expert's determination does not constitute an ar-
bitration award and cannot be enforced under the Arbitration Ordinance.
How, then, can experts' determinations be enforced? It is suggested that
an expert's determination can only be enforced under the law of contract.
Failure to obey an expert's determination constitutes a breach of the Rules
and the party seeking enforcement of a determination must commence a fresh
action in court based upon the contract. Such proceedings may, of course, be
commenced by way of application for summary judgment under RHC Order
14. Enforcement provisions in respect of expert's determinations are, there-
fore, somewhat disadvantaged when compared with arbitration awards in that
they can only be enforced by way of fresh action in the court and can simi-
larly only be enforced internationally following court proceedings and
consequent order.
(d) What is the potential liability of an expert adjudicator in negligence?
Unlike arbitrators who enjoy a certain degree of immunity in negligence," it
would appear that, as a matter of general law, an expert can be held liable in
negligence, unless the parties have expressly agreed that he will not be so
liable. This was the conclusion reached by Dillon LI in Jones v Sherwood Com-
puter Services plc,29 approved subsequently by Kaplan J in Mayers v Dlugash,0
where the learned judge ruled that an expert might be sued in negligence in
the absence of an agreed immunity." The expert would also be amenable to
suit under the Supply of Services (Implied Terms) Ordinance (Cap 475s) for
failing to supply his services with reasonable care and skill.
In respect of determinations made under this scheme, the Rules provide
that the Panel is to be immune from suit.
28 S 2GM of the Arbitration Ordinance provides that an arbitral tribunal is liable in law for an act done
or omitted to be done only if it is proved that the act was done or omitted to be done dishonestly.29 Note 20 above at 286. Dillon LJ cited as authority the decision of the House of Lords in Sutcliffe v
Thackrah [1974] AC 727, HL. For further authority see Arenson v Casson Beckman Rutley & Co [1977]
AC 405, HL.
30 [1994] 1 HKC 755.
31 See also Kuah Kok Kim v Ernst & Young (a firm) [1997] 1 SLR 169, where Lai Kew Chai J held that an
action might be brought against experts either in negligence or for breach of contract.
(2001) HKLJ
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Conclusion
The extent to which disputants will avail themselves of this new mode of
dispute resolution remains to be seen. Inasmuch as it provides a procedure for
resolution which is private and which should reduce delay and cost for the
parties, the new scheme for dispute resolution must be welcomed.
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